Interview by Giulia Olini with Serafima Andreeva and Gabriella Gricius
This morning, we woke up to news from Davos that President Donald Trump said an “agreeable framework” for a Greenland deal had been reached after meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. However, for the moment, key points remain unclear. Trump has described it as a “framework of a future deal” and has offered few specifics beyond continued talks on a US missile-defence shield (the “Golden Dome”) that would be partly based in Greenland. Rutte said Greenland’s status within the Kingdom of Denmark “did not come up,” and a NATO spokesperson later stressed that he had proposed non compromise on Greenland’s sovereignty.
Author’s note: The interviews were conducted prior to the most recent announcement; nonetheless, they provide valuable insight into the longer-term dynamics that shape (and often outlast) short-term media attention in the High North.
Against this backdrop, the surge of commentary in recent weeks is hardly surprising. The Arctic has been cast by many as the next frontline of global competition, routinely (and often somewhat casually) invoking China, Russia, rare earths, Europe’s supposed weakness, and ever more elaborate strategic narratives.
Yet, however easy it may be to reduce every foreign-policy dynamic to “Risk” style board-game logic, the reality is (fortunately) more complex, layered, and harder to compress into slogans.
That is why we chose to speak with Serafima Andreeva (Fridtjof Nansen Institute) and Dr. Gabriella Gricius (The Arctic Institute; University of Konstanz), experts who genuinely know the Arctic, to offer an analysis that is both rigorous and respectful of a region that is far more than a passing “trend” or the latest short-lived wave of mass alarmism.
How does this episode change the “rules of the game” in the Arctic? Does it accelerate the shift from a governance-first region to a more openly contested geopolitical arena?
SA: I dont think it immediately changes the rules of the game, but i think it shows that first of all, Arctic exceptionalism is definetly dead. Russias war against Ukraine threatened it but the US threats to aquire Greenland put the nail in the coffin. We will have to see if it changes the rules of the game because it also depends on how Russia interprets this, but my bet is that they won´t threaten Arctic territories or Svalbard as much as it puts countries close to the eastern european border at risk, so Moldova, Romania, etc. I think this could also send signals to China in terms of Taiwan, but we will have to wait and see.
GG: I wouldn't call the Arctic an openly contested geopolitical arena, but I would say that the episode with Greenland has shown Europe that it cannot rely on the US, even more so than was expected. This may have, however, changed how Russia views the game - can it expect the US to be fully invested in Europe as its security guarantor?
What does the Greenland debate signal about the return of spheres-of-influence language in the High North, and how might that reshape regional alignments among Arctic states?
SA: I think that the spheres of influence never really left. The European and North-American Arctic are still heavily reliant on the United States and have been for a long time. However, I think one thing it will change is that the smaller states will seek more towards cooperation with each other (e.g. Nordics, as well as Canada leaning more towards the nordics and Europe), and if the relations over Greenland really end up tensing up I think it could also lead to a gradual sectoral de-coupling from the United States. It is difficult to imagine a world where we would not be dependent on the US, so I think especially in the current times the dependency on the US would still be there, but perhaps with more discussions about how Europe and the Nordics can stand up for themselves in terms of deterrence (and reassurance).
GG: Certainly the Greenland debate tells us that the US is now using the language of spheres of influence - quite literally, hemispheric spheres of influence. It may portend a more serious European Arctic alignment, but much of this was already happening under the auspices of Nordic governance.
From an institutional perspective, what does this mean for the Arctic Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness, especially given the Council’s current constraints and the post-2022 climate?
SA: I think that the Arctic Council has been under some geopolitical high pressure in the latest years considering its chairmanship periods. Right now, the chairship is in Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark´s hands, and it was in Russia in 2022, so the fact that the organisation has survived all of this turmoil shows signs of its resilience. Still, I think that the key to this is that the Arctic Council is not made to be a decision making body, but a decision-shaping one, and is thriving best as an organisation when the work is going under the geopolitical radar, which seems to be the case right now. Of course there are limitations to cooperaiton, but it seems like all the Arctic states, both the Western ones and Russia agree on that the Council right now serves everyones interest. But maybe this is because Donald Trump has not discovered it yet, because I dont think he would like it if he found out it exists.
GG: The Council's struggles with legitimacy have already been challenged by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and many have been anticipating a similar challenge from the US as the Council faced in Trump 1.0 - i.e., that they do not see climate change as a threat/reality. This means even more so that the Council will go into 'resilience' mode.
How do you expect Nordic and North Atlantic security dynamics to evolve after this? Does it strengthen NATO’s Arctic role, or create uncomfortable intra-alliance tensions that spill over into regional cooperation?
SA: I think we already see and we will see more of cooperation between the Nordics as well as the European states. Also more cooperation with Canada. Regarding the question of intra allience tensions I think we already see that there are issues between member states that NATO will have to address, especially considering the high dependence on the U.S. But at the same time we would have to see how the current situation will be resolved.
GG: This does pose serious challenges for the Nordics, all of whom see the US as the most important security relationship. It may then signal a moment in which the Nordics will not only double down in NATO but also in intra-Nordic cooperation.
If we look at Russia and China, does this episode give them strategic opportunities in the Arctic (diplomatically, informationally, or in terms of regional presence)?
SA: No, I would not say that the Trump interest in Greenland gives any strategic benefits to neither Russia nor China. Of course, it does show how vulnerable areas such as Svalbard are, as well as showing them that the alliance between the US and Europe is not problem free, but it does not present any direct opportunities. Russia is benefiting heavily from the current regime on Spitzbergen, and will probably not change their entire Arctic priorities over this. The same would go for China. Outside of the Arctic, however, I think that there are more potential issues with Taiwan, Ukraine, and all of the «Great powers» near abroad, where their priorities already lie. I dont think that the Arctic is restricted in that sense.
GG: Absolutely. For Russia and China this moment is a strategic moment that allows them to frame the US as a hypocritical actor in the Arctic that claims to talk morally and on behalf of the rules based world order but in actuality acts similarly to both of these authoritarian states.
Looking ahead 12–24 months, what are the most plausible regional scenarios for the Arctic: managed competition, institutional fragmentation, or a more explicit security dilemma? What early-warning indicators would you watch?
SA: It is difficult to predict when things are changing by the day and hour almost, especially after watching the talks in Davos, but I think we are meeting an unpredictable and almost erratic United States that is willing to put a form of pressure on its allies that it formerly has primarily put only on its adversaries.
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Serafima Andreeva is a researcher at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and a Research Associate at The Arctic Institute. Her work focuses on Arctic governance and geopolitics, including the post-2022 security environment and the evolving role of institutions such as the Arctic Council. She is also the creator and host of What’s New? a podcast on Arctic geopolitics, governance, and security, supported by The Arctic Institute and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (highly recommended, especially right now).
Dr. Gabriella Gricius is an Arctic security scholar whose work focuses on how Arctic and northern European politics are shaped by defence cooperation, strategic competition, and hybrid challenges. She is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Konstanz’s Zukunftskolleg and a Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, and she also serves as a Fellow and Media Coordinator with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN). She earned her PhD in Political Science at Colorado State University (2025).
Giulia Olini is a first-year PhD student in Institutions and Policies at the Catholic University of Milan. Her research interests lie in the field of international relations and geopolitics. Her research project analyses weaponised interdependence in the dynamics between the United States and the European Union. Another area of research concerns the Arctic Region, a topic on which she has published: The Arctic in Transition: How the Russo-Ukrainian War Challenged Exceptionalism and Reshaped Regional Governance and Security, Global Age 1(1), 2025. Previously, she worked for almost three years as a Corporate Intelligence Analyst, focusing on international security, at two leading Italian banking institutions.
