This volume, the second in the series, discusses the application of the principle of proportionality in European banking discipline. Modulating the rules according to the characteristics of each bank, in particular, can be very expensive. This is one of the reasons why European legislation often tends to prefer "one-size-fits-all" regulatory solutions. Even when considering smaller banks, the legislator also neglects the peculiarities that characterize cooperative credit banking groups: although conceived as real "supervisory tools" and composed mainly of small and non-complex banks, they too end up being subject to the same rules dictated for large institutionsThese are the premises from which the authors move in formulating possible solutions to the problematic retreat of proportionality. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that the application of this principle does not lead to an unjustified relaxation of prudential discipline, in order to avoid threatening the stability of the entire financial system. In this sense, the recent crisis in the US banking sector – culminating in the failures of Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank and First Republic Bank – allows us to formulate articulated conclusions, capable of distinguishing between prudential capital requirements, corporate governance rules and supervisory requirements.
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